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NOTES AND COMMENTS
assault with a deadly weapon, the handcuffs not being presented in evi-
dence and no evidence being introduced as to their size, weight, charac-
ter or manner of use. Mr. Justice Clarkson dissented vigorously, bas-
ing his contention for the deadliness of the weapon largely upon the
proven physical incapacity of the victim at the time of the assault, it
appearing that he was then suffering acutely from heat prostration and
that he died therefrom twelve hours after the assault.
The two most recent cases on the question of determination of the
deadliness of a weapon are State v. Davis1 7 and State v. Harrison.'8
In both of these cases, the former involving a hoe and the latter an ice
pick, the trial judge charged the jury that the weapon was deadly
per se, although there was no further particular description of either
instrument in the indictments, and upon neither trial was the weapon
presented for inspection by either judge or jury. In both cases the
Supreme Court held the charge to be erroneous, and held that the ques-
tion of the deadliness of the weapon should have been submitted to the
jury under proper instructions. It would appear that the safest method
of determining the question of deadliness, where the trial court is un-
certain of whether the weapon is deadly per se, is to submit the ques-
tion to the jury under instructions directing them to consider the matter
of its use as well as other circumstances attending the assault and rele-
vant to the question. For if the weapon is deadly per se, and the jury
decides the question of deadliness in the affirmative, the failure to so
instruct them will be cured by verdict.
Thus it can be seen that the court of last resort of North Carolina
has provided clear and sensible guideposts for both the practicing law-
yer and the trial judge, both of whom are faced so frequently with the
question of the deadliness of a weapon in the prosecution of criminal
offenses. It is an ever present possibility that some new and previously
unclassified instrumentality may come before the court for classifica-
tion. But when that event occurs, the likelihood of a proper determina-
tion of the question in the court below is greatly increased by its ability
to resort to such a long and unwavering line of well-considered au-
thority.
CHARLES F. COIRA, JR.
Automobiles-Recording of Liens-
Certificate of Title
Expanding production of new automobiles and its stimulation of
trading in used cars renews interest in the legal problems of the sale and
distribution of automobiles on credit. A timely reexamination of the
7222 N. C. 178, 22 S. E. (2d) 274 (1942).
"225 N. C. 234, 34 S. E. (2d) 1 (1945).
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law applicable to these credit transactions will bring to light instahces
in which the law has failed to keep pace with the economics of install.
ment selling. It is the purpose of this note to review one such instance,
and to suggest remedial legislation.
The chief instruments of installment selling are conditional sale
contracts and chattel mortgages, both of which are devices designed to
give the seller security title' until the purchase price is paid, and the
buyer possession and use of the car while paying for it. By statute
in North Carolina both chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts
must be recorded.2 The purpose of recording is to publish notice of
the divided ownership of the property, to protect creditors or purchasers
of the mortgagor from secret liens and encumbrances ;8 and to accom-
plish this the processes of recordation, and its corollary, investigation,
must be simple, convenient and consistent with sound business prac-
1 Or, in some states, a lien only. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES & CONDITIONAL
SALES (6th ed. 1933) §1.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "No deed of trust or mortgage for real
or personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors
or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mort-
gagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county
where the land lies; or in case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or
mortgagor resides; or in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of
the state, then in the county where said personal estate, or some part of the
same, is situated; or in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee, or
mortgagee resides. For the purposes mentioned in this section the principal
place of business of a domestic corporation is its residence."
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-23: "All conditional sales of personal property
in which the title is retained by the bargainor shall be reduced to writing and
registered in the same manner, for the same fees and with the same legal effect
as is provided for chattel mortgages, in the county where the purchaser resides,
or, in case the purchaser shall reside out of the state, then in the county where
the personal estate or some part thereof is situated, or in case of choses in
action, where the donee, bargainee or mortgagee resides." By construction and
extension of the language of §47-23 the court has developed the rule that con-
ditional sales are in legal effect chattel mortgages in North Carolina. Hether-
ington & Sons, Ltd. v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713 (C.C.A. 4th, 1928) ; Union Trust
Co. v. Southern Sawmills Co., 166 Fed. 193, 200 (C.C.A. 4th, 1908); Grier v.
Weldon, 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E. 200 (1933) ; State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829,
167 S. E. 63 (1925); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130
S. E. 319 (1925); Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918);
Piano Co. v. Kennedy, 152 N. C. 196, 67 S. E. 488 (1910); Hamilton v. High-
lands, 144 N. C. 279, 56 S. E. 929 (1907) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 121 N. C.
168, 28 S. E. 257 (1897) ; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99
(1894); Butts v. Screws, 95 N. C. 215 (1886); Note (1943) 21 N. C. L. REv.
387, 390. Whether the full implications of this view will be realized and followed
for all purposes, it is clear that in matters of registration conditional sales will
be treated as chattel mortgages. Therefore, throughout this note the terms
"mortgage," "mortgagee" and "mortgagor" will include respectively, "condi-
tional sale contract," "conditional vendor" and "conditional vendee." On the
distinction between chattel mortgages and conditional sales generally see JONES,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§26-33(b), pp. 937-48; Magill, The Legal Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Various Methods of Selling Goods on Credit (1923)
8 'CoRN. L. Q. 210.
'Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 13,o67 S. E. 48, 51 (1910) ; Empire Drill Co.
v. Allison, 94 N. C. 548, 553 (1886); Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191, 192
(1885) ; Blevins v. Barker, 75 N. C. 436, 438 (1876) ; JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 1
J§190, 1004; WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §327.
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tices. Tested by these considerations the present North Carolina re-
cording statutes are unsatisfactory in their application to the sale or
mortgage of motor vehicles.
In this jurisdiction the registration of mortgages on real and per-
sonal property has been held of prime importance,4 and a strict applica-
tion of the necessity and effect of recording has prevailed. Although
the stated purpose of registration is notice of the mortgage lien,5 regis-
tration acting as constructive notice, the settled and oft-quoted rule in
this state is that no actual notice, however full and formal, will supply
the place of registration. 6 Nor will a reference in a mortgage to a
prior unregistered lien establish the validity of that lien in law,7 unless
the mortgage is expressly made subject to the earlier lien.8 Thus,
though registration is not necessary to the validity of the mortgage
between the parties,9 failure to register, or delayed or defective regis-
tration, has severe consequences. The seller loses his security interest
to creditors'0 or purchasers for value" from the buyer-mortgagor,
'Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 157, 159, 144 S. E. 835, 837, 838
(1928).
' Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584, 588 (1843).
'Brown v. Burlington Hotel Corp., 202 N. C. 82, 161 S. E. 735 (1931);
Threlkeld v. Land Co., 198 N. C. 186, 151 S. E. 99 (1929); Fertilizer Co. v. Lane,
173 N. C. 184, 91 S. E. 953 (1917); Springs v. Cole, 171 N. C. 418, 88 S. E.
721 (1916); Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903); Blalock v.
Strain, 122 N. C. 283, 29 S. E. 408 (1898); Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C.
358 (1874); Notes (1931) 72 A. L. R. 165, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 274. However,
a mortgagee who takes possession of the property to enforce his lien before
any subsequent rights attach has a valid prior lien, such possession taking the
place of recorded notice. Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925).
Cf. Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 566 (1932).
'Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161 S. E. 212 (1931); Lawson v. Key,
199 N. C. 664, 155 S. E. 570 (1930); Story v. Slade, 199 N. C. 596, 155 S. E.
256 (1930); Hardy v. Abdallah, 192 N. C. 45, 133 S. E. 195 (1926); Blacknall
v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369, 109 S. E. 72 (1921) ; Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C.
168, 63 S. E. 723 (1909).
' Hardy v. Fryer, 194 N. C. 420, 139 S. E. 833 (1927) ; Avery County Bank
v. Smith, 186 N. C. 635, 120 S. E. 215 (1923) ; Bank v. Vass, 130 N. C. 590,
41 S. E. 791 (1902); Brasfield v. Powell, 117 N. C. 140, 23 S. E. 106 (1895);
Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. C. 28, 8 S. E. 890 (1889)
' General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928); Dry-Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564 (1916);
Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188, 13 S. E. 770 (1891); Butts v. Screws,
95 N. C. 215 (1886) ; Deal v. Palmer, 72 N. C. 582 (1875) ; Leggett v. Bullock,
44 N. C. 283 (1853). And the widow or personal representative of deceased
mortgagor stands in his shoes. McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204
(1910); Hinkle v. Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34 S. E. 554 (1899); Williams v.
Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886). An unregistered mortgage is good against sheriff's
seizure of automobile for illegal use by mortgagor without knowledge of mort-
gagee. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 799
(C.C.A. 4th, 1928); South Georgia Motor Co. v. Jackson, 184 N. C. 328,
114 S. E. 478 (1922); Skinner v. Thomas, 171 N. C. 98, 87 S E. 976 (1916).
"0 Creditors include those obtaining a lien by attachment, execution, or other
proceeding, but not general creditors. Elk Creek Lumber Co. v. Hamby, 84
F. (2d) 144 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936); In re Cunningham, 64 F. (2d) 296 (C.C.A. 4th,
1933); National Bank of Goldsboro v. Hill, 226 Fed. 102 (E.D.N.C. 1915);
Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343 (1876). Receivers in insolvency proceedings
are creditors. National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Price, 195 N. C. 602, 143 S. E.
1945]
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even if these outside parties had full knowledge of the encumbrance.
And the buyer-mortgagor may lose his possession and interest in the
car or have to pay the claims of prior lienors. If the recording acts
are to be rigorously enforced it is imperative that they provide a system
suited to modern conditions.
While local registration is perfectly adapted to mortgages on real
property, it has not solved the problem of the movable chattel, specifi-
cally, the automobile.' 2 Like many states, 13 North Carolina requires
registration of a chattel mortgage in the county where the purchaser
resides, or in the case of an out of state purchaser the county where
the chattel is situated.14 Such registration is not in fact adequate
notice or protection against fraud. It is too easy for the mortgagor to
sell the car in another county or state, representing it to be unencum-
bered.15 It is too difficult for the prospective purchaser or creditor to
search the records of several counties to uncover liens.1 6 And if
208 (1928); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508,
142 S. E. 767 (1928); Yelverton Hardware Co. v. Garage Co., 184 N. C. 125,
113 S. E. 601 (1922); Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526
(1917). Section 70(c) of the National Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 879 (1938),
11 U. S. C. §110(c) (1940), gives a trustee in bankruptcy the status of lien or
judgment creditor. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1942) §§70.56-8.
"1 Purchasers for value include subsequent mortgagees. Wallace v. Cohen,
111 N. C. 103, 15 S. E. 892 (1892); Southerland v. Fremont, 107 N. C. 565,
12 S. E. 237 (1890); Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C. 431, 6 S. E. 370 (1888);
Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885); Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 235 (1878);
Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343 (1876); Potts v. Blackwell, 57 N. C. 58 (1858).
Assignees for benefit of creditors are purchasers for value. Cowan v. Dale,
189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925); Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C. 323, 98
S. E. 818 (1919). But a tort-feasor against the mortgaged chattel is neither
purchaser nor creditor. Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130
S. E. 319 (1925). In Wallace v. Benner, 200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795 (1930)
the registration statute was held not to defeat application of the doctrine of
equitable subrogation of lien in favor of one advancing money to pay off existing
mortgage liens upon the property. Cf. Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369,
109 S. E. 72 (1921).
12 Note (1939) A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration, 48
YALE L. J. 1238.
jONES, op. cit. supra note 1, §§190, 1008 et seq.
14 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 23; See also Industrial Discount Corp. v.
Radecky, 205 N. C. 163, 170 S. E. 640 (1933) (residence means actual residence
and not domicile); Ward v. Southern Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. (2d) 773
(M.D.N.C. 1929) (foreign corporation has no residence in state regardless of
location of its principal place of business).
15Compare Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588
(1936) with Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891). N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §14-114 makes the fraudulent disposal of mortgaged property
by the mortgagor a misdemeanor. See (1940) 26 VA. L. Rxv. 1074 commenting
on Virginia statute requiring filing of liens on motor vehicle certificate of title.
On the problems of recordation in confliot of laws: JoNEs, op. cit. stupra note
1, §§260, 1158-61; WIu.IsToN, op. cit. supra note 4 §339; Notes (1938) 17
N. C. L. REv. 56, (1928) 41 HAgv. L. REv. 779, (192) 6 MINN. L. REv. 153,
(1934) 6 Miss. L. J. 416; (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 111; (1929) 13 MINN. L.
REv. 724; (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 749.
1 A properly recorded mortgage need not be recorded again in the county
to which the property is removed by the mortgagor. Barrington v. Skinner,
I (Vol. 24
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recording is in the wrong county, which is not unlikely in view of
shifting residences and shifty buyers, the mortgagee is at the mercy
of parties dealing with the mortgagor. 17
Out of the complex security transactions of dealers, manufacturers
and finance companies' 8 rises one of the most vexing situations in this
field-the clash between a recorded mortgage on-the dealer's cars and a
sale to an innocent purchaser from the stock in trade. Recognizing
the common failure to check dealers' titles and the hindrance to busi-
ness such checking would occasion, most courts protect the purchaser
without actual notice by finding an express or implied agency in the
dealer to sell free of the mortgage lien, or an estoppel against the mort-
gagee's enforcement of the lien. 19 North Carolina has applied the
agency doctrine,20 but not the broader principle of estoppel.2 1
Since defective registration is no registration at all, sellers or mort-
gagees may find themselves ensnared by technical pitfalls in the record-
ing process. Chattel mortgages and conditional sale agreements must
be acknowledged and probated before registration,2 2 and proper index-
117 N. C. 47, 23 S. E. 90 (1895); Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 6, 10 S. E.
127 (1889). A few states permit filing of mortgages on movable chattels with
the secretary of state, thus making them effective anywhere in the state. Legis.
(1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 635, 639.
'In re Franklin, 151 Fed. 642 (E.D.N.C. 1907) (mortgagor had no fixed
place of residence and recording in county where mortgage executed was proper) ;
Sloan Bros. v. Sawyer-Felder Co., 175 N. C. 657, 96 S. E. 39 (1918) (Georgia
mortgage of truck located in N. C. not recorded in N. C.); Bank of Colerain
v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) (mortgage of sawmill and fixtures
registered in county where mill located); Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C. 431;
6 S. E. 370 (1888) (mortgage of stock of goods of branch store registered in
county where store located).
" See Adelson (1935) The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PRo. 218. The article states that large finance companies find
it more economical to set up a reserve against losses to third parties from failure
to record than to comply with recording statutes. Myerson (1935) Practical
Aspects of Some Legal Problems of Sales Finance Companies, 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PaoB. 244, at 250.
1 Fogle v. General Credit, 122 F. (2d) 45 (App. D. C. 1941), 136 A. L. R.
814, 821 (1942); (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 334; '(1939) 23 Mx xN. L. R~v. 846;
(1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 837; (1930) 2 Rocxy MT. L. Rxv. 261; (1940) 3
U. OF DETROIT L. J. 152; (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 755.
"Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. (2d) 29 (1944);
Merritt v. Kitchin, 121 N. C 148, 28 S. E. 358 (1897) ; Etheridge v. Hilliard,
100 N. C. 250, 6 S. E. 571 (1888) ; Bynum v. Miller, 89 N. C. 393 (1883).
"' Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928); Rogers v.
Booker, 184 N. C. 183, 113 S. E. 671 (1922); Note (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 306;
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 573. The purchaser from the mortgagor without knowl-
edge of the recorded mortgage may be sued by the mortgagee for conversion.
Whitehurst v. Nixon, 196 N. C. 823, 146 S. E. 599 (1929)."N. C. GE.N. SaT. (1943) §§47-1 through 47-17; National Bank of Golds-'boro v. Hill, 226 Fed. 102 (E.D.N.C. 1915) ; Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128
S. E. 155 (1925); Best v. Utley, 189 N. C. 356, 127 S. E. 337 (1925) ; Allen v.
Stainback, 186 N. C. 75, 118 S. E. 903 (1923) ; Lance v. Tainter, 137 N. C. 249,
49 S. E. 211 (1904); Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, 35 S. E. 1035 (1900);
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99 (1894); Long v. Crews,
113 N. C. 256. 18 S. E. 499 (1893); White v. Connelly, 105 N. C. 65, 11 S. E.
177 (1890) ; Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 235 (1878); Starke v. Etheridge, 71 N
C. 240 (1874).
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ing and cross-indexing are essential parts of registration. 23 On the
other hand, recording within a specified time limit is not required, the
instrument simply taking effect against subsequent parties from the
date and hour of recordation. 2 4  And as recording ig good until can-
cellation of the mortgage, or the expiration of fifteen years, 2 5 renewal
during the life of the average car is unnecessary.
If a different method of registering automobile liens were available,
one which provided central registration for the whole state, simplified
the procedure of registration and investigation, and combined actual
notice through documents in common use in the trade with construc-
tive notice through recording in one place, would its adoption not be
highly desirable? As a matter of fact, the fundamentals of such a
system exist at present in the provisions of the North Carolina Motor
Vehicle Act 26 requiring a certificate of title for every automobile oper-
ated on the public highways, 27 and without major change this Act can
supersede the general recording acts in their application to mortgages
on this class of extremely mobile chattels.
Every owner28 must apply to the department of motor vehicles for
registration of his automobile and issuance of a certificate of title.29
The department has. broad powers to investigate the genuineness and
legality of the application, 80 and may refuse registration for stated
causes, one of which is a reasonable belief that issuance of the certifi-
cate would constitute a fraud against the rightful owner or lienor.31
The certificate contains owner's name and address, date of issuance,
28 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §161-22; Tocci v. Nowfall, 220 N. C. 550, 18
S. E. (2d) 225 (1941); Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 196 S. E. 352
(1938); Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161 S. E. 212 (1931); Story v.
Slade, 199 N. C. 596, 155 S. E. 256 (1930); Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C.
154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928); Merchant & Farmers Bank v. Harrington, 193
N. C. 625, 137 S. E. 712 (1927); Fowle v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639
(1918); Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S. E. 543 (1918); (1938) 52 HARV.
L. REv. 170. For a justification of courts' demands for strict compliance with
the statutory details of recording, see (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 351.
"'Blacdnall v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369, 109 S. E. 72 (1921); Carolina-
Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee Riv. Power Co., 175 N. C. 668, 96 S. E.
99 (1918); McKinnon v. McLean, 19 N. C. 79 (1836); Davison v. Beard, 9
N. C. 520 (1823).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-37(5).
"Id. §§20-38 through 20-84; 220-3.
" Certain vehicles are exempt from the registration and certificate of title
requirements, for example, federal government vehicles, cars brought into the
state by non-residents under reciprocity permission, farm tractors and other farm
implements, and new cars held by manufacturers or dealers for sale. N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §20-51.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-38(t) defines owner to include conditional
vendee and chattel mortgagor.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-50, 20-52. The application must bear the
written signature of the owner, acknowledged by him before a person authorized




description of the car, and "a statement of the owner's title and of all
liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle therein described, and whether
possession is held by the owner under a lease, contract or conditional
sale, or other like argreement. '32  Where liens exist the certificate is
mailed to the holder of the first lien, to be retained until payment.
33
Certificates remain valid until cancelled by the department for cause or
upon transfer of title or interest.3 4 A transfer is accomplished by
endorsing an assignment, warranty of title and notation of liens on the
back of the instrument,3 5 and forwarding it to the department, which
then issues a new certificate showing any liens or encumbrances. 36 The
same procedure is followed for a lienholder's release or assignment of
his interest to the owner.
37
No certificates are needed for new automobiles held by manufac-
turers or dealers,3 8 but upon sale to other parties applications must be
forwarded to the department. 39 And every vendor of used cars must
accompany delivery of the machine with an endorsed certificate of
title. 40 Other sections of the Act cover keeping of records in the state
agency, 41 their inspection by the public, 42 fees for issuance and trans-
fer of certificates, 43 and monthly reports by manufacturers and dealers





"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-73. Where transferor is a conditional vendor
or mortgagor he may then forward the certificate to department for recording
of the lien. Id. §20-72(b). Where transferee is a dealer he need not forward
until resale of the car. Id. §20-75. If certificate is lost or unlawfully detained
the department may issue a new one upon proper application. Id. §20-76. §20-77
provides for transfers by operation of law, such as bankruptcy, execution sale,
repossession by vendor; transfers by inheritance, devise or bequest; and notice
of sale under mechanics lien.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-58(a), 20-59.
sId. §§20-51, 20-79(b). Several states require the delivery of a manufac-
turer's or importer's certificate of origin upon sale of a new automobile to dealer,
and the assignment of this certificate to a purchaser from the dealer. NEB.
CouP. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) §§60-1002, 4, 5; OHio GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page,
1938) §§6290-2, 4, 5; TEX. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1,
§§28, 29.
" N. C. GEx. STAT. (1943) §20-52. Both the dealer and purchaser fill out,
the application form, thus insuring a double check on the amount and nature
of any lien created.
"0 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-221. A statute requiring sellers of used cars
brought in from other states to post bonds to save purchasers harmless from title
failures and assessing a ten dollar fee for each bond filed was declared uncon-
stitutional as an interference with interstate commerce. Id. §§20-220, 20-222,
20-223; McLain v. Hoey, 19 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.C. 1937).
"1 Registration and title certificates are filed by registration number, owner's
name and engine number, and these records are checked prior to any vehicle
registration. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-55, 20-56. All applications and sur-
rendered certificates of title are retained to permit tracing of title. Id. §20-78.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-43.
" Id. §20-85 (fifty cents for each new certificate).
"Id. §20-82.
19451
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cate has been issued is made unlawful, 45 and penalties are provided
for this and other violations of the statute.
46
In 'view of these comprehensive provisions for lien recording it is
not surprising that the argument was soon advanced that the statement
of mortgages and conditional sales on a certificate of title was sufficient
notice to third parties. The court answered this contention in Carolina
Discount Corporation v. Landis Motor Cornpany47 by declaring the
Act "a police regulation to protect the public from fraud, imposition and
theft of motor vehicles, ' 48 and holding that it did not repeal by impli-
cation the general registration acts.49 This decision is in accord with
the'refusal of other courts to construe similar statutes as recording
•acts, 50 except where a contrary legislative intent is clear.5 1
However, the legislative trend has been toward utilization of certifi-
cates of title as the exclusive method of recording liens on automobiles,
as well as aids in recovery of stolen vehicles and administration of state
taxes.52 Today fifteen states and the District of Columbia make the
certificates constructive notice of liens and encumbrances, and exempt
mortgages on automobiles from the general recording acts. 8 The
" Id. §20-111 (a).
"Old. §§20-176, 20-177. See also §§20-39, 20-59, 20-71, 20-74, 20-108, 20-111,
20-112.
1"190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925). The case involved the original
certificate of title act, N. C. PuB. LAws 1923, c. 236, but its provisions are
basically those of the present statute.
"Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 160, 129
S. E. 414, 416 (1925).
"'After deciding that defendant purchaser from the mortgagor was owner
of the automobile, the court suggested that the superior court could properly
order plaintiff to deliver the certificate of title to defendant. Id. at 161, 129
S. E. at 417 (1925). For the same results by an action to recover possession
of the certificate, see Fogle v. General Credit, 122 F. (2d) 45 (App. D. C. 1941)
Associates Discount Corp. v. Hardesty, 122 F. (2d) 18 (App. D. C. 1941).
" Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v. Faunkhauser, 65 F. (2d) 655 (App, D. C.
1933); in re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 687 (D. Md. 1928); L. B. Motors, Inc. v.
Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E. (2d) 129 (1940); Nelson v. Viergiver,
230 Mich. 38, 203 N. W. 164 (1925); Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120
Ohio St. 568, 166 N. E. 808 (1929) ; Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren State
Bank, 117 Ohio St. 69, 158 N. E. 81 (1927); King-Godfrey v. Rogers, 157
Okla. 216, 11 P. (2d) 935 (1932); accord, Amick v. Exchange State Bank,
164 Minn." 136, 204 N. W. 639 (1925). Cf. Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co.
v. Skaug, 4 Wash. (2d) 46, 102 P. (2d) 227 (1940). Note (1932) 8 NoTs
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"lin re Berlin, 147 F. (2d) 491 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1945); It re Wiegand, 27 F.
Supp. 725 (S. D. Cal. 1939) ; Van Syckle v. Keats, 125 N. J. L. 319, 15 A. (2d)
321 (1940); Commercial Credit Co. v. Amer. Mfg. Co., 155 S. W. (2d) 834
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
" Legis. (1936) 12 Wis. L. REv. 92.
" ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §66-231; CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943) Vehicle
Code §§195-8; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §5574(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943)
§319.15; MiCE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) §9.1497 (applies to acces-
sories only); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §1758.3;
NEB. Comp. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) §60-1009, as amended by NEB. Ssss.
LAWS 1943, c. 134, §4; NEv. Comp. LAWS (Supp. 1931-41) §4435, as amended by
NEv. STAT. 1945, c. 240, §§15(a)-(g); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) §39:10-14 (con-
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
great need is of course uniformity throughout the nation, and there
have been demands for a national registration system.54 However, an
effective state-wide recording system supplies uniformity within the
state, and through its tie-up with state registration plates and certifi-
cates of title provides real notice and protection to out of state pur-
chasers and creditors.
In order to simplify automobile financing, protect innocent parties,
preserve the security interest of conditional vendors and mortgagees,
and eliminate opportunities for fraud, the following provisions should
be added to the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act :55
1. No mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention
contract, or other lien or encumbrance 56 on or covering a motor
vehicle or on any equipment or accessories affixed or sold to be affixed
to such vehicle shall be valid as against creditors or subsequent pur-
chasers or encumbrances but from its registration in compliance with
section 2 to 6 of this act.5 7
2. There shall be deposited with the register of deeds in the
county where such instrument is executed a copy of the instrument
evidencing such lien or encumbrance, with an attached oT endorsed
certificate of a notary public, accompanied by the certificate of title
last issued for such vehicle, or if no certificate has been issued there-
ditional sales only); N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) §§W8-113-9, as amended by N. M.
LAws 1943, c. 73, §§8, 10; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) §6290-9; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 75, §§33, 38; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE
(Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1, §§41-5; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §§57-3a-
80-7; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942) §2154(64)(b); D. C
CODE (1940) §40-702.
In addition to these states, seventeen states, including North Carolina, require
certificates of title for motor vehicles, but do not make notation of liens on the
certificates constructive notice. Legis. (1936) 12 Wis. L. REV. 92.
r Isaacs, Installment Selling: The Relation Between Its Development it
Modern Business and the Law, (1935) 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoB. 140 at 146.
Upholding the constitutionality of similar acts are State v. Taggart, 134
Ohio St. 374, 17 N. E. (2d) 758 (1938) and In re Fell, 16 F. Supp. 987
(E. D. Pa. 1936).
"This would include trust receipts used in the purchase of motor vehicles.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767
(1928).
"'Just as under present recording acts this would leave an unregistered
mortgage good between the parties. See discussion of Virginia statute in Janney
v. Bell, 111 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The amendment would not
make the certificate of title conclusive as to ownership of the car. The statutes
of California, Iowa, Kansas Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Utah
provide that every transfer oi title or interest in a motor vehicle is void unless
in compliance with the certificate of title act. Notes (1939) 37 Micu. L. Ray.
758, (1935) 94 A. L. R. 948. This strict title registration system represents a
radical departure from the normal requirements of a valid sale or transfer of
personal property, and tends to produce more uncertainty and litigation than at
present; it is not considered advisable for this jurisdiction. However, an amend-
ment to the Act making certificates of title prina facie evidence of title would
promote regularity and reliability of title papers without the disadvantages of a
rigid system of registration.
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for, by an application by the owner for an original certificate of title.
Upon receipt of the above documents in proper order the register of
deeds shall endorse thereon the date and hour received, and shall
collect a registration fee, which shall be uniform throughout the state.
On the same day on which received, the register of deeds shall for-
ward said documents, together with such part of the fee charged as
may be prescribed by statute, to the department of motor vehicles
for filing and recording of the lien or encumbrance upon the certifi-
cate of title. Further filing or registration in the office of register
of deeds shall not be required nor of legal effect.
3. Upon receipt of the copy of the instrument evidencing a lien
or encumbrance and the certificate of title or application therefor,
the department shall file .the same, and shall issue a new certificate of
title in usual form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of
all liens and encumbrances certified to the department against said
vehicle. The department shall maintain an appropriate index of all
lien, encumbrance or title retention instruments filed, and shall fur-
nish upon request information on liens and encumbrances against
motor vehicles.58
4. Such filing and the issuance -of a new certificate of title shall
constitute the exclusive method of giving constructive notice of all
mortgages, deeds of trust, conditional sale or title retention contracts
or other liens or encumbrances against the vehicle described therein,5 9
and such mortgages and other instruments shall be exempt from the
provisions of sections 47-20 and 47-23 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina. Provided, that if the documents referred to above
are received and time 'of receipt endorsed thereon by the register
"To provide for instances of loss caused by departmental errors in issuing
and transferring certificates of title, recording liens and furnishing information,
the department should be required to set up an insurance fund for payment to
injured parties. See Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance
Corp., 164 Va. 579, 180 S. E. 408 (1935) for an example of such a loss.
" It may be wise to provide specifically for mechanics' liens created by N. C.
Gar. STAT. (1943) §44-2. By judicial construction of this statute a mechanic's
lien on a motor vehicle is superior to the lien of a recorded mortgage or condi-
tional sales contract. Reich v. Triplett, 199 N. C. 678, 155 S. E. 573 (1930);
Johnson v. Yates, 183 N. C 24, 110 S. E. 603 (1922) (in a strong dissent Clark,
C. J., argues that the decision permits the mortgagor to "improve the owner
out of his property"); Carolina Sales Co. v. White, 183 N. C. 671, 110 S. E.
607 (1922); cf, Willis v. Taylor, 201 N. C. 467, 160 S. E. 487 (1931); Twin
City Motor Co. v. Rouger Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371, 148 S. E. 461 (1929);
Notes (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 127, (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 762, (1934) 88
A. L. R. 1185, (1936) 104 A. L. R. 267. A suggested provision: "Liens and
encumbrances noted upon certificates of title shall have priority over any other
liens against such motor vehicle, however created or recorded, except the
mechanics' lien for repairs given by §44-2 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, to the extent of fifty ($50) dollars." See CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943)




of deeds within six days after date said documents were excuted,
constructive notice shall date from the time of execution, otherwise
from the time of receipt as shown by the endorsement of the register
of deeds thereon.
5. The holder or owner of every mortgage, deed of trust, condi-
tional sale or title retention contract or other lien or encumbrance on
any vehicle registered in another state and filed or recorded in that
state shall within ninety days after such vehicle is removed to this
state file with the department of motor vehicles the original or a certi-
fied copy of such mortgage or other instrument. Every mortgage or
other such instrument not so filed shall be subject to any lien or
encumbrance against such vehicle thereafter filed with the department
according to this act, provided said vehicle shall have continuously
remained in this state for said period of ninety days. ,
6. This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the
date of its ratification, except that it shall not affect the validity of
any mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention con-
tract, or other lien or encumbrance on a motor vehicle which was exe-
cuted and registered according to law at the date of such ratification.
But all such mortgages and other instruments not filed with the de-
partment within a period of six months after said date of ratifica-
tion shall be subject to liens and encumbrances thereafter filed against
such vehicle.
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Causes-
Removal by an Automobile
A considerable contribution to legal animism is made by a recent
opinion of a Federal District Court sitting in South Carolina.' A
state statute2 provides that when a motor vehicle is operated in viola-
tion of law or negligently one thereby sustaining personal injuries or
property damage has a lien on the vehicle for his damages and may
attach it in the manner provided for other attachments.3 A native son
was killed in an automobile accident and his administrator brought
action in the State Court for $25,000 against the car's owner (who was
apparently also its driver) and, pursuant to South Carolina practice,
against the car itself. The owner was served -personally and the car
was attached. The car was licensed in Pennsylvania, of which state
"Weatherford v. Radcliffe et al., 63 F. Sunp: 107 (D.C.S.C. 1945). The
"al." is "one Sport Model four-door. Ford Automobile, 1944 Pennsylvania
License No. IFC76."'Code of Laws of S. C. (1942) §8792.
a This statute has been in force, without amendment, since 1912. It refers
to damages to "a buggy or wagon or other property."
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